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SUMMARY 
he modernization project launched by the West two 
centuries ago, was based on three pillars: State-logic, Ca-
pital-logic and Ratio-logic; formulated in part by 
Montesquieu (France), Smith (Britain) and Kant 
(Germany). The logic of the State implied centralization 
of coercive power, tempered by democracy. The logic of Capital implied 
market forces for economic power, tempered by anti-monopoly clauses. 
The logic of Ratio implied secularization for normative power. The result 
was spectacular, with bureaucracies, corporations and universities being 
major carriers of the triple logic, with ring-effects all o ver. 
All of this was colored by Western deep culture, with its focus on 
dominión over nature; a sharp body-spirit división mirrored in a social 
división between merchants catering to the body, clergy catering to the 
spirit and aristocracy protecting both but also having ultímate power 
(whence grew Capital, Ratio and the State); social atomism 
(individualism) with hierarchic organization of people; epistemological 
atomism and hierarchic organization of ideas (deductive systems); a 
very dichotomous world image; and a religion/ideology seen as singularist 
(the only Truth) and universalist (valid for the whole world). Abroad 
"modernization" became Westernization, and with the recent 
predominance of Economic Man became identified with economic 
growth as the key program for the whole world the last decades. 
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Much naivete is needed to believe that this can happen without 
enormous social costs, whether in the form of the slow but thorough 
modernization of the West or the more superficial, but quicker 
Westernization of the rest. The costs are there. 
The focus of the paper is on two basic types of costs: destructuration, 
or atomie, weakening of direct interaction, deculturation, or anomie, 
weakening of compelling norms. 
The result is "monadization" (Leibniz) of society into mutually isolated 
monads steered by egocentric cost-benefits. 
This is seen as a process "from nomadism to monadism", from den-
se relatively horizontal structures with norms of compassion for the in-
group, gradually weakened as vertical structures with norms of 
submission grow stronger and more world-encompassing un til the latter 
also weakens through automation/information. The result is an enormous 
increase in violence at all levéis of social organization, the atomie/anomie 
syndrome being found in relations to nature, inside the human self, at 
the micro-level of the family, the meso-level of society and the macro-
level of the world society, for instance in inter-nation relations. 
A number of factors are explored for their contribution to this situation, 
such as economism, secularization, human rights, literacy, health, Román 
Law, etc. But no single factor is held responsible for such comprehensive 
changes. Epistemological atomism would probably itself be a major 
contributing factor. 
If it is in the weakening of structures and cultures that the source of 
so much violence and social disintegration today can be found, then it is 
in social development, meaning (re)structuration and (re)culturation that 
remedies have to be found. Some examples of rehumanization are given. 
The Japanese social construction is seen in this perspective as still hol-
ding out against Westernization. Many, many more are needed. The 
situation is serious, and rapidly wiping out advances elsewhere. 
I. THREE THESES ON SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION 
To go straight to the issue, the first thesis is simply: many human 
societies (perhaps most) are in a state of advanced social disintegration 
at the cióse of the 20th century, at the threshold of the Third millennium 
AD. This does not mean the situation is irreparable. But it does mean 
that remedies have to be found and enacted quickly, partly to halt 
disintegration (negative social development), and partly to build more 
solid societies, not only integrated but less susceptible to social 
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disintegration (positive social development). Such societies should also 
be capable of providing "human security", hereinterpreted as satisfying 
basic human needs (positive human development), or at least of reversing 
processes of human needs degradation (negative human development). 
In the same vein, they should be capable of enhancing the eco-systems, 
building diversity and symbiosis (positive nature development), or at 
least of halting processes of eco-system degradation (negative nature 
development). To this should be added a world dimensión: if the world 
is a society of societies that society should also be integrated (positive 
world development) or processes toward disintegration should be 
reversed (negative world development). 
Four spaces of development (Nature, Human, Society, World), and 
for each one a more modest negative task and a very ambitious positive 
task. A tall bilí! In addition, these lofty goals may not even be compati-
ble: a disintegrating society may also be more flexible, capable of mee-
ting new challenges; and an integrated society may also be too rigid to 
take on, creatively, new tasks. But that all remains to be explored. 
Dramatic, somewhat apocalyptic statements like the thesis above 
are frequently heard nowadays. They can be brushed away as more 
cases of drama supply to meet a perennial drama demand. Another, 
less reassuring interpretation, would be that there might be much truth 
to them. At this introductory phase of thestory to be told in these pages 
one point should be made: a thesis about social disintegration is not in 
and by itself a statement about eco-crisis (depletion, pollution, over-
population or any combination of the three), about misery, unemployment, 
low or negative economic growth, or violence and war. The statement 
is about society as something sui generis, of its own kind, as sociologists 
have always insisted. "Social disintegration" in addition as another 
problem, closely related, perhaps even moresignificant in its consequences 
than all the other global problems alluded to as nature, human and world 
development. And being different the problem will hardly yield to reme-
dies designed for the oíd problems. New approaches are called for. 
So, let us identify social disintegration as a global problem, among 
other global problems, distributed on the spaces of the human condition 
used above, adding the "space" of time, so far used mainly for ecology, 
and culture: 
SPACE: GLOBAL PROBLEM: 
NATURE: ecological degradation, population 
HUMAN: poverty/misery, repression, spiritual alienation 
SOCIETY: economic underdevelopment; social disintegration 
WORLD: massive violence, war (inter-state/inter-nation) 
TIME: non-sustainability 
CULTURE: inadequacy 
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The four global problems italicized above have already received ge-
neral attention to the point of being the basic foci of the many endeavors 
by the United Nations under the headings: "environment" (for nature), 
"human rights", "development" (for society) and "peace" (for the world), 
with a time dimensión added recently; "sustainability". Although nobody 
is in favor of non-sustainable solutions to the problems of environment, 
human rights, development and peace this is a useful reminder of the 
importance of solutions being reproducible, if possible even self-repro-
ducible (as opposed to stop-gap measures or measures that consume 
more problem-solving resources than they produce). 
The other three problems on the list above have not entered the 
general discourse, yet. There are reasons for that. The specialists on 
"spiritual alienation" would be religionists andpsychologists, on social 
disintegration social scientists in general and sociologists in particular, 
and on the possible inadequacy of mainstream (meaning Western) culture, 
religionists again, cultural anthropologists, philosophers. In other words, 
new expertise, so far mainly limited to UNESCO meetings. They do 
not carry the same weight as the natural sciences, economics, and security 
studies assumed adequate for the problems discussed. 
The three additional problems are also found in the core of the 
dominant social formation, in and of the West, questioning individual 
internalization, social institutionalization, and the culture. Lives lived 
without meaning, societies disintegrating, cultures without answers, are 
serious problems sui generis; notonly side-effects or side-causes of the 
problems of eco-breakdown, misery and war. Moreover, they are strongly 
related. 
For the second thesis we need a simple definition formula: social = 
structural + cultural. By "structure" we simply refer to "patterned 
interaction", the macro, gross, general picture of "who relates to whom, 
how, when and where". This is social traffic as seen from the top of 
Empire State Building, not by watching drivers from the corners of 
Fifth Avenue and 42nd street in NYC. The key word is pattern, not the 
individual variations. There are no individual ñame tags. Human beings 
appear as "driver", "cop", "pedestrian". The structure changes over 
time. The term is inseparable from the term "process"; there may be 
stability, secular trends up or down, cycles (with any period, like the 24 
hours and 365 days cycles in the example above). 
By "culture" we mean the what and why of interaction; and the 
what not/why not important in explaining missing interaction; the structure 
not there, the absent link of interaction. Whereas interaction is between 
actors (and patterned interaction is the mega-versión of the single inter-
act); culture is within actors. But it may be shared: patterned culture is 
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the mega-version of the individual why and why not; the mutual rights 
and obligations of interaction, the expectations, on binding normative 
culture. 
The second thesis can now be formulated: at the roots of social 
disintegration is a twin process of destructuration and deculturation, 
heading for structurelessness and culturelessness. Following Durkheim 
we shall refer to culturelessness as anomie; and then introduce a 
neologism for structurelessness, atomie. Of course we have not come 
that far. Society is not yet a heap of mutually isolated social atoms, 
individuáis; and there is still much binding normative culture around. 
But we may be on the way. 
To where, to what? To a society of Leibniz' monads, fully self-
sufficient? Obviously not, for human individuáis can hardly survive in 
total isolation. But we can easily imagine inter-action reduced to a thin 
minimum, like some e-mail contact; making society a set of isolates 
more than a structure relating positions fdled with individuáis. In other 
words, the actor would be the isolated individual as such, not the indivi-
dual as, for instance, pater familias, as "head" of the family, as CEO 
("Chief Executive Officer") or SEO ("State Executive Officer", the 
head of state/government). And the normative culture informing these 
individuáis about what to do would be centered on that which serves 
the individual. No interacts, only acts. 
In short: at the end of the road winding through history and into the 
future we see a social formation ("society" may no longer be the term) 
basically atomized into individuáis, thinly and weakly related, each acting 
out of egocentric cost-benefit. We are cióse to this state of atomie, but 
there is still some interaction left. We are also cióse to anomie, where 
the only binding normative culture left would be individualized cost-
benefit analysis. Anarchy would be another term, bellum omniumcon-
tra omnes, homo homini lupus. The social fabric (le tissu, el tejido), the 
social body, lo social, falls apart. 
The third thesis might read something like this: we are at a stage in 
human history where the problem is not only whether interaction 
structures between individuáis, groups and countries are right or wrong, 
but whether there is any structure at all; and not only whether the culture 
defining right or wrong is right or wrong, but whether there is any 
normative culture at all. 
On the road we would expect a number of social phenomena. 
First, we would expect the focus of interaction to shift from "mutual 
rights and obligations", a reciprocal mix of egoistic and altruistic 
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orientation, to an egoistic orientation of "what is in it for me". For 
organization members the shift is from reciprocity to "what can the 
organization do for me". Like predators they descend upon macro-
organizations like State and Capital, preying on them for individual benefit, 
then withdrawing with the booty. Meso-organizations, like NGOs 
including parties, trade unions, churches, are used as stepping stones. 
Micro-organizations like families and friends are not spared. Spouses 
will demand services like sex and security, and in addition "freedom" 
(particularly husbands). The offspring sees the family as a launching 
platform in Iife and offer little or nothing in return after, and even before, 
take-off. 
Second, we would expect increasing corruption at all levéis of social 
organization. By "corruption" we mean a way of using organizations 
for egoistic purposes, influencing decisions by injecting resources (money, 
sex) into the process; corruptor or corruptee acting out of egoistic cost-
benefit analyses. 
Third, with social nets, organizations, decreasing in significance and 
the social knots, the individuáis, on the increase, we would expect 
increasing mobility out of nets, relations and organizations; indicating 
that they have been used. After exit there may be entry into new ones, 
or into individual monads. People will vacate bonds between spouses, 
parents and children, siblings, friends, neighbors and colleagues, 
frequently and easily. New relations may become increasingly thin, 
shallow. 
Fourth, we would expect increasing violence at all levéis of social 
organization. There would be no absolute, binding norms standing in the 
way, no homo res sacra hominibus. Other human beings inside the 
organizations will be seen as substitutable, the relationship being so thin 
anyhow, henee as expendable. Outside the organizations they will be 
seen as resources. The utility supposedly accruing from violent acts 
will be weighed against the disutility of punishment, and the probability 
of detection/punishment. As violence becomes pandemic the latter 
probability will tend to zero given the asymmetry between the ease of 
committing a crime and the difficulty of detecting it. 
Fifth, we would expect increasing mental disorder, assuming that 
human beings are not made for high levéis of atomie/anomie but for 
interactive human togetherness, guided by mutual rights and obligations, 
in thin and thick human relations, definitely including the latter. Conduct 
indicative of mental disorders, such as drug consumption, alcoholism, 
sexoholic and workaholicbehavior, perverse physical and verbal violence, 
are also efforts to fínd identity in tighter and thicker human interaction, 
and in the deeper recesses of the Self. They are outer and innerjourneys. 
On the social costs of modernization 129 
When such efforts fail suicide is a possible way out; not only out of 
despair, but also as the ultímate act of egoism. 
Summarizing, this is a fairly bleak, some would say far too dark 
image of human society today. But the problem right now is to understand 
these processes in order to arrive at some idea of where we are right 
now; ou en sommes-nous. For that we need some kind of macro-
historical perspective, with all the shortcomings of abstracting and 
general izing from a super-complex reality. 
II. A MACRO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
Imagine we now divide human history in four phases, calling them 
"primitive", "traditional", "modern" and, then, "post-modern". In other 
words, "modernity" is not seen as the end of history, and certainly not 
as global market economy cum democratic polity; a social formation 
seen here as highly unstable. A fourth phase is added, the phase that 
comes after modernity, like the "middle ages" come between antiquity 
and modernity, and "metaphysics" comes above or after physics. The 
post-modern phase. The term is frequently used; the following is an 
effort to give that term a richer connotation. 
"Primitive" will be identified with mobile hunter-gatherers and 
nomadic pastoralists; "traditional" with sedentary, local agriculture and 
the emergence of classes and castes that do not have to engage in 
manual work for a living; "modern" with the large-scale organizations 
of State, Capital and Media, building state, regional and world 
bureaucracies, markets and meanings; and post-modern with the 
destructuration and deculturation alluded to above. The post-modern 
society is seen as essentially chaotic and anarchic for reasons to be 
given in some more detail below. In other words, it is not seen as a 
global versión of modernity but as its antithesis, or as one of several 
antitheses. 
The story to be told here, reduced to a brutally simplistic formula, is 
the story of humanity on its way from nomadism to monadism. For that 
social story to be told we shall proceed onthe two parallel tracks above; 
one structural and one cultural. To do this some concepts are indispen-
sable. 
Above some references have been made to thick versus thin 
interactive relations. Let us now shift to primary and secondary relations, 
defining primary (in the Weber-Toennies-Sorokin-Parsons tradition) as 
"diffuse" ("thick") and particularistic, meaning relating to that 
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particular Other, not to anyone of the same kind (in other words, the 
relation is non-substitutable). The definition of "secondary" would be 
based on the opposite pair: "specific" ("thin") and universalistic, meaning 
treating everybody of the same kind, satisfying the same (low) number 
of characteristics, the same way. The classical examples of primary 
relations would be to cióse relatives; the more remote (cousins four+ 
removed, for instance) being treated the same; and friends. And enemies. 
But it would also include colleagues and neighbors, work places and 
voluntary organizations. In short, kinship and friendship, vicinity (also 
community) and affinity, workship (also school) and worship. High 
interaction frequencies will rub off; over time small-and-thin relations 
will be thicker and less standardized. For all six cases some collective 
Self is defined, offering identity and some security in return for some 
altruism. 
Let us then introduce another variable, so often missing in social 
analysis: size, the sheer number of people involved. Let us divide 
organizations into "small" and "big", the dividing linebeing roughly the 
upper limit to the number of people a human being can identify, and 
relate to, positively and negatively. The order of magnitude would be 
102-103. Since primary relations are based on identification, we arrive 
at the simple conclusión that big-and-thick is impossible. Secondary 
relations will tend to be big (and vice versa); only when small can they 
be primary. 
Thus, human interaction structures come in two basic modes: thin-
and-big, and thick-and-small. Letus cali them Alpha, thepyramid, and 
Beta, the wheel. In modern societies Alpha is organized by the three 
pillars of society, State, Capital and Civil Society, in the form of huge 
bureaucracies (including armies and universities), corporations, and 
people organizations. But inside Alpha small, informal Beta structures 
of people with primary relations, such as colleagues who become friends, 
or enemies, would be nesting; growing in cafeterias, over repeated 
encounters in lifts, some evolving into super-Beta relations known as 
love. Seen from Alpha they all introduce personal and subjective elements 
in the impersonal, objective atmosphere of a perfectly constructed Alpha, 
with everybody substitutable, even if this means alienated. Alpha people 
are right: those who spy on Alpha centers for state and corporate secrets 
often use Beta networks, including love relations, to get access, like the 
classical secretary making extra photocopies for a friend. 
Let us then introduce a third variable, vertical versus horizontal, here 
seen as relational, not only relative, as exploitative, grossly asymmetric 
in terms of net benefits. Why do people enter such vertical, exploitative 
relations? Because they may have no choice, forced by coerción or 
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tradition. The alteraative to exploitation may be starvation (Marx on 
capitalism). The result is vast action spaces for people on top, strait-
jackets at the bottom; material enrichment on top, impoverishment lower 
down. Challenges on top, routines at the bottom. In horizontal relations 
this is better distributed; gross asymmetries lead to break-ups in thin 
relations. 
Alpha tends to be vertical. Layer can be added to layer, in principie 
covering all of humankind through processes of globalization in one big 
pyramid or hierarchy with a single apex. This projection of the State 
would be known as World Government, and the corresponding projection 
of Capital as the World Market. The present G7 has aspects of both. 
But so far alphaization is clearly more pronounced at the regional than 
at the world level; the European Union as seen in the Maastricht Treaty 
being one example (the Soviet Union was another, but State and Capital 
were more clearly merged into one pyramid than in the EU or the U.S.). 
Beta can be both vertical and horizontal (Gamma). A tribe run by 
chiefs and shamans, villages run by Big Men and land-owning families, 
families run by a pater familias, marital relations under conditions of 
patriarchy (and the infrequently found matriarchies), or the small farm/ 
firm with very tight and very authoritarian relations under the "boss" 
are thick and small and also vertical. And they can be horizontal like in 
kinship and friendship/enmity groups, among neighbors and colleagues; 
with other human beings in general, in worship and workship. 
Horizontal Alpha structures can also be imagined (Delta). At present 
electronic communication, like Internet, may serve as an example, as 
long as the information superhighway has atopography without centers 
and peripheries. Transportation superhighways tend to be rooted in big 
urban centers reaching into the peripheries. However, peripheries could 
be connected, leveling the center-periphery gradients. In the same vein, 
the information super-highway willprobably develop even steep gradients 
(like toll gates); and we are back to traditional Alpha. 
As pointed out repeatedly, societies, or social formations more 
generally, as we know them, are mixes of Alpha and Beta. The question 
is how strongly either one is articulated. So let us answer that question 
in terms of "strong" and "weak" for both, giving four combinations 
(Alpha/Beta is not a dichotomy): 
Figure 1: Human social (trans)formations: Structural macrohistory 
Alpha strong 
Alpha weak 
II. Traditional society 
I. Primitive Society 
Beta strong 
III. Modera society 
IV. Postmodern society 
Beta weak 
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The story, as reported here, follows the double line, and starts in the 
bottom left comer. A humanity divided into small mobile groups, clans, 
lineages, small enough to be "in-groups", with primary relations 
dominating, essentially kinship. A tight net of mutual rights and obligations 
spun inside the group, possibly with negative or no relations at all toward 
the out-groups they would encounter on their wanderings. They, precisely 
they, would probably be conceived of as categories of people, noteven 
with the differentiae specifícae given to them by Alpha logic in terms of 
their social positions and their qualifications for being allocated to such 
positions. The in-group would be too small to develop layers of verticality 
beyond gender/generation and for that reason be well integrated socially 
and humanly. The weak point would be not only the thin or empty relation 
to othergroups, but also that integration may be too tight, "suffocating". 
With sedentary ways of producing for a livelihood and ahigher level 
of agricultural productivity—one family working onthe land producing 
enough surplus for 1.1, even 1.25 families— the material basis was laid 
for the classical caste-systems: 
Figure 2. Non-manual castes: Four systems. 
First 
Second 
Thírd 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Europe 
clergy 
aristocracy 
merchants 
workers 
outcasts 
women 
children 
India 
brahmin 
clergy 
kshatriya 
warriors 
vaishya 
merchants 
shudra 
workers 
outcasts 
women 
children 
China Japan 
shi'h shi (samurai) 
bureaucrats, intellectuals 
nung no 
farmers 
kung ko 
artisans 
shang sho 
merchants 
outcasts outcasts 
women women 
children children 
The history of traditional society becomes to a large extentthe history 
of the relative power of the upper layers in what has to be an Alpha 
structure, unless the unit (eg., the village) is small. One possibility is the 
ranking order indicated above; with the European and Indian systems 
being quite similar, and the Chínese and Japanese also quite similar 
(thus, formulas like "Indo-European" and "Sino-Japanese" apply not 
only to languages). Another possibility, as pointed out by Sarkar, is a 
circulation of castes, in the order kshatriya-brahmin-vaishya-shudra (the 
kshatriya enter to créate order after the people have had their say, but 
they are culturally so primitive that the brahmins enter to restore culture, 
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but they are economically so amateurish that the vaishya have to put 
the economy in order, but they are soexploitative that the shudra people 
make revolts, and so on). 
At this point solid vertical distinctions between people and élites have 
emerged. Alpha structures, mainly local, are being articulated. Modernity 
brings that process further in Alpha strictu sensu: country-wide, 
hierarchical, with a well-defíned specifícity in social relations stipulated 
in written contracts, and a universalism opening the positions in the 
structure forcitizens satisfying well-defíned, explicit qualifiers. Diffuse, 
particularistic relations have to be weeded out from the Alpha garden, 
ultimately to look like the orderly French gardens that emerged at about 
the same time (not baroque!). For Beta relations, please use time after 
working hours, and weekends. 
As Alpha becomes more dominant, Beta not only becomes recessive, 
but starts disintegrating. One reason is simple: individual time budgets. 
Alpha requires full attention, because the jobs provided by Alpha are 
full time jobs, and because the occupants of Alpha positions are not 
supposed to think Beta thoughts. Some Beta structures have to go, 
starting with such oíd work structures as extended families and traditional 
villages. Cities are to Alpha what villages are to Beta: liberatingpeople 
from the stranglehold of very tight human relations in a village, trien 
suspending them in the thin air of urban anonymity. 
Cities provide more space for Beta structures than villages for modern 
Alpha structures. However, these Beta structures are decreasingly 
related to work and increasingly to leisure, leading to the well-known 
pattern in many modernized countries today: villages gradually being 
con verted from sites of agricultural producción to sites of weekend leisure, 
and to some primary and tertiary production, plantation and tourism, for 
far-away buyers. 
We now have to introduce a thesis, or rather an hypothesis, important 
for the following: A Beta structure is natural to the point of being indis-
pensable for human beings. Only Beta type relations cater to the whole 
person and give the person a sense of belongingness. This should not be 
confused with identity or sense of meaning of life; that can be enjoyed 
also in an Alpha structure, even in a non-structure (Formation IV). To 
belong is to have a home, somebody to relate to, somebody who knows 
more of the story than any bureaucracy can do. The argument is not in 
favor joint or nuclear families, different sex or same sex unions, with or 
without children. The argument favors some Betaunit, thick-and-small, 
with more total relations. 
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Objection: if Beta is the natural structural environment, how is it 
possible for Alpha to expand at the expense of Beta? 
Answer: because Alpha has much to offer in the short run. For 
those on top Alpha offers the material fruits of verticality; power, 
challenges. For those lower down the gains may tum into losses, but the 
costs of being marginalized may be still higher. The Alpha lure, you are 
in it!, even as a peón in the post office in a village in East Bihar, or 
second speed EU member, is there. For Alpha holds out a reward for 
good behavior unknown to Beta: upward mobility, if not for you, maybe 
for your offspring. In Beta there is always room for improving the relation, 
to become a better friend, a better neighbor. But if an attraction of Beta 
is precisely its horizontality, then there is no way up. Ñor is there any 
way down. There is a way out: if you do not behave. The problems, and 
the attractions, in Alpha are vertical. In Beta they are horizontal: 
belongingness versus loneliness. 
One formula often used for modern society is Alpha forproduction, 
Beta for reproduction. From Alpha the work output may be considera-
ble. In Beta human beings are repaired, maintained, sustained. 
Formation I would show high levéis of stability, keepinghumans intact, 
leaving few traces on nature as the work output is negligible and the 
consumption of natural resources likewise. 
Formation II leaves more traces. There will be monuments to the 
glory of the upper castes: temples (mosques, churches) for the clergy, 
forts for the warriors, market places, banks etc. for the merchants; 
poverty forthepeople; all wrapped together in cities. But even if human 
beings are exploited and repressed, they still belong somewhere, 
sustained, repaired. Reproduced. 
In formation III, however, production starts outstrippingreproduction. 
The output is phenomenal. Alphas of all kinds get deeper roots and 
expand geographically and socially, coveringever larger territories, not 
only countries govemed by states, but empires governed by mega-states. 
The production of goods/bads and (dis)services outstrips what anyone 
might have imagined. But Betas are disintegrating, and not only the 
extended family and the traditional villages. The nuclear family splits 
not only between husband and wife, but also between parents and 
children, and among siblings. Neighborhoods break down when people 
move geographically too frequently to sustain relations based on vicinity. 
Invariably the same will apply to friendship and to affinity: neither can 
survive the high levéis of social mobility, sideward, upward, downward 
of modern society. Worship under the same God may still remain. About 
God, however, see next section. 
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The transition from primitive to traditional was made possible by the 
agricultural revolution, growing plants and breeding cattle in a relatively 
sedentary, basically Beta way. The transition from traditional to modern 
was made possible by the industrial revolution providing the goods, the 
scientific revolution providing the knowledge, and the transportation-
communication revolution extending Alpha reach. 
But how about the transition from modern to post-modern? As we 
are talking about destructuration anything removing human beings from 
direct interaction would count. A key word is tele. Direct interaction is 
multisensorial; no telecommunication so far goes beyond the auditive 
and visual. Interaction is till there,but it is trimmed down, stripped, more 
naked. As anyone talking over the telephone without watching the fa-
cial expression and thebody language will know information gets lost in 
the process. And as anyone comparing telefax to telephone knows, the 
tone of voice may say more than the words. So the term "information 
revolution" will not be used, not for the obvious reason that what is 
conveyed is often disinformation, but because of the high level of de-
information when so much quality is lost. Information retrieved from an 
encyclopedia or CD-ROM is not the same as information conveyed by 
a loving parent or concerned teacher (but the two obviously do not 
exelude each other). 
Symbolic interaction via words or other symbols, whether arriving 
on ordinary or information highway substitutes for direct human 
interaction. The term is symbolic revolution, from proclamad on of ediets 
via modem media to automation-robotization. Alpha is there. But human 
relations are not. 
An image: Los Angeles, 1992. Certain parts of the once magnificent 
city are wastelands. There are streets and buildings, even shops, even 
if waste is piling up all over, the buildings are derelict and the shops are 
barricaded. More importantly, they are all disconnected from each other, 
there is not even a concept of neighborhood. Nobody knows who is 
next door, ñor do they care. People come, goods and services are peddled, 
they disappear. At night everything is locked up, dark, desoíate. 
And that is when the marauding gangs take over. They are the new 
nomads; the city-scape is their resource. Unable to survive in nature 
they know how to survive as hunter-gatherers in the urban wastelands; 
hunting cars, gathering their contents. They are the producís of formation 
IV, crystallized as a new formation I, preying on the wasteland, fighting 
rival tribes, including a pólice tribe hunting and gathering gangs, LAPD. 
Strong Beta structures re-emerging. Ready for a second eyele? 
There is a logic to this. Alpha has not disappeared, but has become 
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very lean and mean, devoid of human content (thus, in Figure 1 we are 
talking about "weak", not "zero" Alpha). Thereis work output, although 
some quality may get lost in this dehumanization process. Much more 
disturbing is the question often raised by the ultímate stage of 
dehumanization: not only is the interaction symbolic rather than direct, 
but the receiver, and sometimes also the sender, is even a non-human, a 
robot. And robots do not crave for Beta groups, they are custom-tailored 
for a high Alpha life expectancy. So the disturbing question is obvious: if 
robots do so much better, for what purpose do we have human beings 
at all? 
The first answer is obvious: even if robots are better at production, 
humans are better at consumption; in fact, the whole purpose of the 
exercise is to libérate human beings from dirty and dangerous, humiliating 
and boring work, leaving all of that to robots so that human beings can 
concéntrate on creative and non-programmable tasks and enjoy the 
fruits, as consumers. 
The second answer would be more reflective, taking into account 
that robots also have to be reproduced, sustained, with energy and spare 
parts inputs, perhaps also reprogramming. The total cost-benefits, even 
done in the most naked economistic way, may turn out to be less obvious 
with the destructuration bilí in. 
The third answer may point out that not so much is lost anyhow. 
With the symbolic revolution not only production can be carried out in 
loneliness; the same applies to consumption. There is a neat isomorphism 
between assembly line production, in series and bureaucratic production 
in parallel, on the one hand, and a magazine circulating in an office (in 
series), and a family consuming TV programs next to each other (in 
parallel) on the other. All four cases are based on action (like turning 
nuts in assembly lines or zapping TV at home), not on interaction. 
The sum total is not only Alpha but perverted Alpha. If now the 
thesis of a human need for Beta as something natural is correct, we 
would expect Beta to be sprouting. But what kind of Beta? Alpha supplies 
all goods and services, leaving few opportunities for green production 
on the side. If Alpha is dehumanized anyhow, then why not treat it as 
such? To whom do you feel more attachment, to your fellow corruptor/ 
corruptee, perpetrator/victim, or to an abstract, symbolic structure? 
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Let us summarize some of the points made: 
Figure 3. Formation structural dynamics: Some basic factors. 
Alpha 
Beta 
Growth 
Exploitation 
Alienation 
Primitive 
weak 
strong 
low 
low 
low 
Traditional 
strong 
strong 
high 
high 
low 
Modern 
strong 
weak 
high 
high 
high 
Post-modern 
weak 
weak 
low 
low 
high 
Why do human beings engage in such exercises? Because the grass 
is greener on the other side. We seem to be fascinated with what is 
missing, and take what we have for granted; assuming it will remain 
there forever and not be eroded by the relentless search for the new. 
Till we end with a very bad deal, indeed. 
Of course Primitive Man becomes fascinated with the growth, and 
with the glory, produced by traditional society. So, as Ibn Khaldun points 
out, the desert tribes knock down the gates and storm the city, sharing 
in the power and the glory, ultimately running it down for lack of asabiyah, 
solidarity (a premonition of the theory underlying the present paper). 
And in the same vein Traditional Man becomes fascinated with the 
tremendous growth and power, with the national, regional and global 
reach achieved by Modern society. He no longer knocks down any 
gates, but he joins as a humble immigrant, at the margin of the host 
country Alpha structures, contributing to destructuration both places. 
He carne from reproduction without production and enters production 
without reproduction. He participates in building The Wealth of Nations, 
at the expense of The Moral Sentiments; thepoint-counterpoint in Adam 
Smith's brilliant reflections. 
III. A MACRO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: CULTURAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
Let us now try the same story from a cultural point of view, focussing 
on binding normative culture, and particularly on the source of normative 
culture, religión and such secular successorsas national-ism, state-ism, 
capital-ism, science-ism. Religión contrasts the sacred and the secular; 
the awe-inspiring, that which cannot be touched, and the ordinary, the 
profane. In many religions there is also a third category: the evil, to be 
feared, to be avoided, and if possible, destroyed. Obviously, people are 
not born with, but into a religión. There may be a basis in thephysiology 
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of the brain (and elsewhere). But details are learnt. 
But what would correspond to Alpha and Beta? There is the 
theological distinction between the sacred as immanent, inside human 
beings and nature, and as transcendent, in a God residing outside the 
planet, above. That god may be a Mother god (like in Japan) or a Father 
god, but in the Occident (as defrned by theabrahamitic religions, Judaism-
Christianity-Islam) this takes the form of Father-Sky, the Father in the 
Sky. The opposite would be Mother-Earth; the Earth that gives birth to 
our livelihood, the Earth that nourishes us, and ultimately receives us 
upon death. 
Immanent religión is more horizontal, transcendent religión more 
vertical. But rather than dividing religions in immanent and transcendent 
it might be more fruitful to talk about immanent and transcendent aspects 
of religions. In the three occidental religions the transcendent aspect is 
dominant; in addition there is Evil, presided over by Satán. Prayer and 
submission to God are the adequate approaches. In immanent religions 
meditation in Self and compassion with Other may play similar roles. 
However, immanent religión has a dark side, tending to beparticularist 
rather than universalist. The sacred nature of Other may apply to the 
in-group only, not to the out-group. Themessage of transcendent religions 
like Christianity and Islam (but not Judaism and Shinto) would be that 
you are all in it, all protected from above. The condition is that you 
submit and pray. 
Figure 4. Human social (trans)formations: Cultural macrohistory. 
Transcendent strong submission 11. Traditional society III. Modern socicty 
Transcendentweak I.Primitive society IV. Postmodcrn society 
Immanent strong compassion Immanentweak 
The story, then, would run approximately as follows. 
Primitive society would be protected by strong ingroupnorms, being 
tight and cooperative. Outgroups may prove friendly but also may not; 
so any notion of the sacred would not a priori extend to Other. They 
would have to prove themselves, not by submitting to the same Father-
Sky, but by relating cooperatively. They become human by being 
accepted parts of the social network, not by any abstract human-ness 
(that is probably Occidental). 
Traditional society might also need some transcendent deities 
particularly protecti ve of the upper layers of society and more accessible 
by them than by coramon people. Religious relations have to mirror 
social relations. But the social unit is still small. Transcendence and 
immanence can be combined. 
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Modem society is almost inconceivable without transcendentreligion; 
sacred or secular; a deus in the rex gratia dei. There has to be an 
authority beyond the apex of the Alpha pyramid as there is so much 
power to legitimize. Father-Sky supplies the authority, not Mother-Earth, 
she is to cióse to everybody. And just as imperialism established the 
first global super-Alphas, imperial rule and trade companies, missionarism 
established the homologue supremacy of universal, transcendent religión. 
This holds for Islamic as well as for Christian imperialism. 
Immanent religión was considered pagan and particularistic, 
standing in the way of a universal god in need of (more than willing) 
missionaries and colonizers to bring the message. Imperialism and 
transcendent religión carne hand-in-hand, one as the condition for the 
other. Indigenous Beta and immanent religión could then be eliminated 
together, as pagan, archaic. 
Objection: how about the Enlightenment, and secularism in general; 
does this picture not paint the Occident too religious? 
Answer: Islamic colonialism/missionarism started right after the 
inception of Islam (+622) and had the foundation of the Sultanate of 
Delhi in +1192 as one crowning achievement. From thei"e it went 
eastward, stopping so far at the southern end of the Philippines. Christian 
imperialism (if we disregard the Román Empire which was not Christian 
in its expansionist period) started for real in the 1490s, westward 
(Columbus) and eastward (Vasco da Gama). The pattern was set under 
religious auspices.Enlightenment carne to Christianity much laten, to 
Islam (perhaps) not yet. Needed was a universal, overarching God/ 
Allah whose commands would be binding on all believing imperial 
subjects. 
Enlightenment and secularization (in the West) set in somewhere on 
the transition from Formation II to Formation III. The functions fulfílled 
by universalist/singularist religions with Chosen Peoples still had to be 
fulfílled, and universally valid science claiming to represent the only 
possible truth with the scientists of various kinds as the Chosen People 
met the bilí. Alpha construction could now be made in the ñame of the 
three modernizations carried by state logic, capital logic and scientific 
logic; as substitutes for religión (with Ratio, rationality, as the overriding 
theme). The project is still on, now under the heading of "development 
assistance". 
But what happened to the Church as the Alpha prototype? The role 
as representad ve on earth of the omni-present, omniscientand omnipotent 
causa sua God, went to the three pillars of power in modem society: 
State, Capital and the Media; the carriers of state logic, capital logic 
and reality representation of modern society. Underlying that a new 
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ethos took shape, nationalism, providing large parts of the world with 
national statism, national capitalism and national media, with the 
disequilibria this leads to when the territories covered by state jurisdiction, 
capital penetration and national settlements do not coincide. 
Of course, to some extent posited against State and Capital is Civil 
Society, with a contract (rule of law/democracy/human rights) with the 
State and, and no contract, only a market place with Capital and Media. 
And new priesthoods emerged as carriers of the new faiths: jurists for 
the State, for Capital the economists, for Media the journalists, for Civil 
Society political ideologists and for the Nations the nationalists. 
In short, the structure of the transcendent God, chosen by Him as 
the Chosen People and chosen by people as object of worship remained 
intact. The places of worship were different, the contení of the prayers 
varied, but the submissiveness stayed. For top positions in Alpha new 
faiths were needed, such as allegiance to the new priesthoods, meaning 
concretely faith inthe human Ratio and such producís as jurisprudence 
and mainstreameconomics. In addition comes faith in the (virtual) reality 
images produced by the Media, and in nationalism. Modern society has 
been laboring under such formulas for some centuries by now. 
Thus, human beings were almost deprived of immanent religión 
through the missionary activities of the religions of the imperial powers. 
But with that project still on the second project of the West, secularism 
started undermining transcendent religión, leaving human beings deprived 
of Father-Sky, with noMother-Earth as alternative, and only small groups 
(Quakers, Buddhists) still insisting on the sacred nature of life, particularly 
human life. And this is exactly Formation IV, for secularism, in the 
shape of humanist ethics, has not been capable of producing binding 
norms for human behavior. Why shall you not commit adultery, kill, 
steal and lie when other humans are mere objects and there is no 
accountability to higher forces as there is no transcendent God anyhow? 
The final result is the total anomie of Formation IV, with human 
beings left with the only normad ve guidance that always survives: 
egocentric cost-benefít analysis. The point is notnormlessness, the point 
is that they are not binding; that is the meaning of culturelessness. The 
process has gone quite far. 
IV ATOMIE AND ANOMIE IN DOMESTIC SOCIETY: SOME 
IMPLICATIONS 
In Figures 1 and 4 two processes have been indicated, through four 
social formations. How far concrete societies, groups or individuáis have 
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come along these trajectories can only be decided through empirical 
studies. But one interesting pointemerges: the more modernized society, 
the further advanced along this trajectory, since by "modernization" we 
mean precisely the triumph of Alpha over Beta as dominant social 
formation, and the triumph of Ratio over the Sacred as dominant moral 
guidance. What was not taken into consideration was that human beings 
may need both Beta for their personal sustenance, and the sacred for 
life to have a meaning and their action to be guided. Alpha alone, and 
Ratio alone, have provided us with material abundanceand impressive 
control and coordination structures (in need of the counterforces 
generated by Civil Society, though, with the Media oscillating in their 
Ioyalties to State, Capital and Civil Society). But deep sustenance and 
guidance they cannot offer. 
Then two things went wrong, both basically unintended. Together 
they catapult us into Formation IV, atomie cum anomie. 
First, Alpha became more and more naked, stripped of human content 
as Ratio provided Alpha with its many gadgets. Take only one example: 
automated telephone systems, not only bypassing the switchboard lady 
through direct dialing, but then landing the cali with "if you want, push 
1", some canned music, and finally a recorded response. Whetherdone 
do save labor expenses (and time), to standardize responses, or to save 
the recipient from any further argument, the net result is destructuration 
as there is no (or very little) direct human interaction involved. 
Second, the hope must have been that Ratio, seen by the great 
Western philosophers as essentially universal, wouldprovide a basis for 
a binding ethic. The problem is not thatRatio may be less universal and 
more a product of the general code of the many human cultures, but 
that Ratio does not genérate sufficient ethical commitment. 
At this point the synergy between the two trajectories heading for 
atomie and for anomie set is. Alpha, in the shapeof a modern educational 
system, is very good at schooling people in the producís of Ratio, at the 
level of primary, secondary and tertiary education. The two not only fit 
each other by being standardized up to the country and regional levéis, 
or the levéis of the nation and the super-nation (an example of the latter 
would be the European Union); they are designed for each other. 
But binding norms seem to become rooted in human beings through 
Beta, through G. H. Mead's significant Others, maybe particularly the 
mother. If now Betas crumble all over the place, down to the nuclear 
family, even to the mother-child bond, leaving more and more of the 
raising of children not even to the school where the single class still may 
have some Beta character, but to the media, parking the children in 
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front of the TV/Video, then it would be a miracle if binding and positive 
norms shouldbecome intemalized. Adding to this the well-known content 
of the media the general picture becomes even worse. 
At least for the "advanced countries" one reasonable hypothesis 
would be that there is a certain synchrony between the processes of 
destructuration and deculturation. For other countries there may be 
important asynchronies to explore. 
King Midas surrounded by gold, his dream, but that is also all he 
has? Not quite that far, yet. But we would expect a general sense of 
pessimism to ensure from this. And that is exactly the general finding 
that emerged from a major comparative 10-nation study Images of the 
World in the Year 2000: the more economically advanced the country, 
the more pessimistic in general terms the inhabitants. A premonition? 
Of course, with Betas crumbling all around them they may easily 
become very lonely. Add to this the alienation at all levéis of Alpha due 
to the strong rules of substitutability, and the exploitation lower down, 
and the lack of any other moral guidance than individual cost-benefít 
analysis, how would we expect people to react? 
Basically the way indicated by the five theses in the introduction. 
But they already presuppose a weakening of Alpha, not only the alienation 
and exploitation/repression of Formations II and III. Under the conditions 
of modern society as such (not yet post-modern) people might react to 
Alpha as such. And if we assume those on top basically to be content, 
wanting to hang on, then the reaction will mainly come from people 
lower down. 
Two formulas: revolt and apathy, boiling and freezing. Whochooses 
what, both or neither is an interesting problem of social psychology. 
From a more sociological point of view these are mass phenomena and 
solíd indicators of malfunctioning, in no way saying that revolts may not 
be justified. However, if there is something humankind should have leamt 
during the twentiethcentury then it would be this: a revolution substituting 
one Alpha for the other, changing priesthood, may not change much. 
But political violence, today referred to as "terrorism", may be a 
problem of structures/cultures partly of the past. Today the problem 
may be no structure/culture at all, and violence, hurting and harming, 
erupting all over as a consequence of social disorganization. Here is a 
typology with eight types of violence: 
- Violence against Nature (ecological crimes) 
- Violence against Self (alcohol/drugs/tobacco, stress, suicide) 
- Violence against Family (child abuse, physical/verbal violence) 
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- Violence against Individuáis (robbery, assault, rape, homicide) 
- Violence against Organizations (corruption) 
- Violence against Groups (inter-class, inter-nation violence) 
- Violence against Societies (inter-state violence) 
- Violence against other Worlds (inter-planetary) 
Types 3, 4 and 5 are today referred to as crimes, and types 6 and 7 
as wars (for a peace researcher they are all violence). The arenas 
differ from one type to the other: all over Nature (like in the rain forests), 
at home, on the streets, in the offices, within a country (internal wars), 
within the world (external wars), between worlds (so far only as science 
fiction). But the net result is the same: life is being caused to suffer, to 
be hurt and harmed and traumatized, even to cease. 
All over the world the same: people in shock after reading, listening 
to, viewing, the media. The world seems to be coming apart. Each 
nation wanting its state. Weapons of all kinds available everywhere. 
Big blocs taking shape at the world level: Rich countries against Poor 
as much as or more than ever; the Rich in North America, Western 
Europe and East Asia pitted against each other; new military alliances; 
culture and particularly religión coming up against secularized élites only 
capable of uttering the standard curse "fundamentalism". Homo homini 
lupus, bellum omnium contra omnes; everybody for himself; apparently 
out of control, unrestrained. Disintegration. 
One common reflection today is that violence has become more 
domestic, less global, world-wide. In terms of the above typology that 
mans more violence of types 1-6 (but type 1 is also global!) and less of 
type 7. Maybe too early to judge; the data indicate constancy rather 
than decline in the level of inter-country violence. There is a perception 
of decreased threat of a nuclear East-West holocaust in Europe; possibly 
due to an over-estimation of that danger during the Cold War and an 
under-estimation of that danger within the Catholic-Protestant/Latin-
Germanic vs. Orthodox/Slav vs. Muslim/Turkish triangle taking shape 
in Europe. At any rate, with that danger removed the world system to 
many (in the Northern part of the world) looks rather peaceful. But not 
domestic society, with nations pitted against each other all over and 
types 1-5 apparently on the increase in most societies. 
The hope of people working for peace has for a long time been to 
have the world system catch up with the best social systems in controlling 
violence, for instance by establishing abinding rule-of-law system. The 
problem, as usually pointed out, is that such rules are not easily 
internalized in an anarchic system with everybody (meaning the states) 
out for themselves and nobody really can function as a Significant Other, 
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a nursing mother. And they are not easily institutionalized either. There 
are mutual rights and obligations. But if A's rightbecomes B's obligation 
and there is no reciprocity the mechanisms for handling the conflict (the 
World Court, the Security Council)are imperfect to say the least. Neither 
rewards, norpunishment(positive and negative sanctions) are impressive. 
What then happens is often hierarchic intervention by big powers. 
People may develop all kinds of Beta, not to mention Alpha structures 
across borders, but the inter-state structures are thin (this is where 
anarchy enters) and vertical (this is where hierarchy enters). Is the 
structure also big? With 184 members of the United Nations and 184 
ambassadors the structure is not larger than what many individuáis can 
handle, fitting nicely intotheir lists of addresses and telephone numbers. 
Being thin and vertical it could easily become Alpha by adding more 
members (such as NGOs, or direct relations to the many nations of the 
world). But it could not easily become Beta. In that case it would rather 
be Gamma, with the permanent Security Council members in loco 
parentis of that extended family. Feudal andpaternalistic, in other words, 
and even so the webs of interaction will have to be spun much more 
densely. 
The basic point here, however, is that far from the world system 
catching up with the better cases of the social systems, it is the other 
way round: the social systems are "catching down" with the world system. 
Read this way Formation IV, replete with atomie and anomie, is a rather 
adequate image of world society: vertical, with symbolic, abstract relations 
rather than direct interaction, short on binding norms and altruistic 
orientation and long on egoistic cost-benefit orientation. There are some 
Beta structures, like among the Nordic, the European Union and the 
ASEAN countries, at the world system level, like in social systems. 
But the Formation IV structure is very evident. And theconsequence is 
obvious: instead of peaceful conflict solution efforts violence is used, 
respecting neither common valúes, ñor any inner voice of conscience, 
ñor the threat of punishment. 
V. FROM NOMADISM TO MONADISM: SOME FORCES 
MOTRICES 
The following is not a theory to account for this rather gigantic change 
in the human condition. Rather than a macro-history it is simply a cata-
logue of twelve factors often mentioned in this connection, an annotated 
list so to speak, even alphabetized to make its atheoretical character 
even more obvious (if not necessarily acceptable to the reader). 
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Capitalism 
The reason why capitalism tends to become not only Alpha but Su-
per-Alpha in its basic structure, even if muchis happening within, is the 
verticality of power that follows when high quality production factors 
(nature, labor, capital, technology and management) are monetized, 
marketed, and mobile. As they have to be put together for production, 
they tend to flow together or at least to be controlled together, from a 
Center. 
The Center uses high quality factors for high quality producís, in 
exchange for lower quality factors and producís from the Periphery. 
Capital is supposed to beget more capital, either directly in the finance 
economy (speculation), or indirectly wheninvested in production factors 
used to produce goods and services in the real economy (production). 
Much begets more which does not mean that little begets less; the cake 
may expand, but then often at the expense of the external proletariat, 
nature, and/or future generations. New about capitalism was not that 
the economy had a peaked structure. What was new was the mobility, 
not only into the Center by investing some initial capital, much hard 
work, saving, greed and inconsideration, but also out of the Center through 
bankruptcy or lack of dy namism. The result was an anti-feudal re volution. 
For the continuation, see Socialism. 
Democracy 
Of course elections are one way of ensuring not only rule by the 
consent of the ruled, but also nonviolenttransition from one set of rulers 
to the next, if they respect the secret ballot. The problem is the Alpha 
nature of that type of democracy; a relation between a Center of 
contending Rulers, and a Periphery of the Ruled, turning the pyramid 
upside-down once every four years (or so). This Alpha shape of modern 
democracy, Democracy II, differs from with the Beta shape of a more 
primordial Democracy I: a group (a small company, a small community 
or a neighborhood, a family or a group of friends, the elders in a tribe) 
dialoguing over issues till consensus is obtained. The relation is horizon-
tal, everybody can address every ody's concern, the outcome is unknown 
in advance, there is neither winner, ñor loser; in good dialogues only 
winners. 
Differentiation 
Another term is "división of labor", ina long social philosophy tradition 
(Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Toennies, 
Max Weber) seen as a basic condition for social progress and economic 
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growth in particular. The total human activity called Work is not only 
subdivided into tasks and subtasks, but new tasks are continuously 
created. As in production of goods and services so also in the production 
of knowledge: undifferentiated Philosophy is subdivided into disciplines 
and sub-disciplines that in addition are hyphenated into cross-discipli-
nes. The structure of the sets of Tasks and disciplines is highly complex, 
but the general idea is differentiation, and with it fragmentation, 
atomization of the individuáis having these tasks and disciplines as their 
job. As book, Limits to Differentiation, is crying to be written. 
Economic Growth 
The process is almost inconceivablewithout a culture accommodating 
not only hard work and saving, but also greed and inconsideration. 
Systems may differ as to whether the pressure is put on the internal or 
external proletariats; on nature, self orthe future. But something hasto 
be moved, or transformed, or both (see Capitalism), and in the process 
organic relations of people to others or raw materials to surrounding 
nature, will be cut or at least transformed. The open wounds in quarries 
and mines have their counterparts in the open wounds in souls detached 
from each other through excessive mobility and transformation. 
Inconsideration means insensitivity to wounds in Self, Other and Nature. 
Beta structures break down, partly dehumanized Alpha structures are 
poor substitutes. 
Economism 
The term is interpreted here as a state of mind, not to be confused 
with the economy (the cycles linking Nature, Production and 
Consumption) or economics (the science about these cycles, today 
essentially a description and theory of one particular economic system, 
capitalism, henee a science that more properly should be called 
"capitalistics"). Economics, orthe culture of homo economicus, can be 
conceived of as a syndrome: 
- a focus on material/somatic satisfaction by goods and services; 
- a focus on the human individual as the unit to be satisfied; 
- a focus on cost-benefit analysis to guide individual choices. 
The syndrome not only detaches individuáis from each other by 
making the single individual the supreme decision-maker(egocentrism), 
but also detaches satisfiers (goods/services) from each other as objeets 
to possessed and consumed one by one. Costs and benefits are then 
used to establish preferences. 
There are severe problems with this syndrome, mind-set: 
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- in practice only a limited number of satisfiers can be used, by 
definition excluding the externalities of economic action; 
- absolute valúes (with infinite positive or negative Utilities) will be 
excluded or relativized since they will oven-ule others; 
- individual preferences are not easily reconciled collectively. 
These are the costs, considerable, of the breakdown of the holismof 
the actors in collectivities, the holism of the object-world, and of absolute 
valúes: destructuration and deculturation. This is also built into the 
technique used: product-sum maximization, which becomes very 
unwieldy for collectivities of not harmonized actors and high numbers 
of satisfiers and useless for absolutes. When used, the result is even 
more atomization, destructuration and the deculturation implicit in rejecting 
absolute valúes. Thus, economism becomes the ultímate consequence 
of Román Law. 
Gender 
Just to pick up one factor, how the genders seem to differ in their 
preference for alpha (male) and beta (female) and no (male) structures, 
assuming that women prefer to relate and network, neither to be isolated 
in loneliness, ñor to be isokated at the top of a hierarchy. Thus, a major 
forcé behindthe drive toward alphaization, and then toward monadism, 
from Formation I to II, II to III and on to IV, would be patriarchy: the 
lading structure is the structure of the leading class. And that should 
also apply to culture: male preference for deductive thinking and 
sumbission to first principie is compatible with atranscendent God; less 
compatible with immanence. But that also opens for a major therapy: 
parity instead of patriarchy, provided women have not become clones 
of men in the process. 
Globalization 
If this terms stands for global mobility of producción factors and 
producís, with more standardizaron of structures and cultures, then the 
consequence is to speed up the transition into Formations III/IV. Larger 
domains for structures and cultural meanings imply thinner scopes, and 
more reliance on least common denominators, with structural and cul-
tural specificsreceding into the background. Given the variety of idioms 
around the world Super-super-Alphas with truly global reach will be 
symbolic, based on mathematics, computer language, etc., or based on 
body language (sport as a universal idiom), and/or on concrete objects, 
goods, like people with no common idiom pointing andtouching. "Here 
are no Greeks, no Jews; no women no men: we are all one in Coca-
Cola" is reality, not a bad joke or blasphemy. 
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And the same goes for structures: no cohesive Alpha has so far 
emerged covering 6 billion human beings except one: global televisión. 
There are two layers: one sender, billions of receivers. No horizontal 
interaction, they relate via the apex. 
Will this structure endure? Probably not. Sooner or later it will go the 
way of all Alpha: small Beta groups take shape, like guerrillas they will 
relate, unite and revolt. The condition is their ability, underestimated by 
Marx, to overeóme structural, cultural and geographical divides. But 
the global market prophets may have underestimated that in its wake 
will follow globalized workers trade unions and consumers movements. 
Proletarians (and consumers) all over the world, unite!" may have a 
reincarnation. Consumer sovereignty, if exercised on a truly global basis, 
may become a mjor forcé at the same time as nation-state democracies 
crumble under the weight of global forces beyond their control. 
Actually, globalization may also run into another problemof an equally 
or more serious nature. Competition has kepteapitalism innovative; not 
only the micro-competition from otherfirms in the same branch (BMW 
versus Mercedes), ñor the meso-competition from another country 
(Germany versus the UK), but the macro-competition from other 
civilization with other capitalisms (Buddhist-Confucian versus Judeo-
Christian). Globalization will keep the micro and meso challenges but 
may strive to iron out the macro differences through homogenization 
into a global business culture. This means a severe reduction of the 
Toynbee factor of challenge followed by the creative response that 
presumably keeps minorities in power. And Alpha is, by the very 
definition builtinto its pyramidal shape, run by a small minority (relative 
to the other layers) in need of constant renewal of personnel and ideas. 
Globalization means mono-culture, less diversity, less symbiosis, less 
resilience. 
Health 
The concern for health fits into the general picture of secularization 
on two important ways: as focus on the body rather than on the state of 
the mind and the spirit, and the translation of etemal life/salvation as 
high Ufe expectaney. Of course modera man enjoys lower morbidity 
and mortality. But there are no gains without some price to be paid, and 
the price is in the cultural rather than structural sector. Could it be that 
the healthy body is less able to share the suffering of others at the same 
time as health, one's own and that of others, is taken for granted, being 
no source of shared joy either? That health leads neither to a culture of 
compassion, ñor a culture of submission follows its wake, but a culture 
of egocentrism? 
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Human Rights 
In principie human rights protect exposed individuáis, emphasizing 
the privacy of the individual human body, of the individual human soul/ 
mind/spirit, and the equality of all categories of humans relative to the 
law. Human rights soften relations between the Center (the state) and 
a Periphery of individualized citizens, which is good; but also emphasize 
reliance on a protective, soft Center rather than human reliance on 
each other. An ethics of Alpha submission rather than Beta compassion, 
designed to soften (not weaken) the strong Alphas of Formation II and 
III, in ways paving the way to Formation IV. 
Industrialization 
No doubt this was a major factor in the transition from Formation II 
to III, and lead to well known problems of vertical división of labor 
(exploitation) within the company between employers and employees, 
within the country between raw material and industrial goods producing 
district and between countries also according to the degrees of 
processing. The organization at all three levéis was Alpha, with a plethora 
of Beta groups flourishing at all levéis, fromboys' clubs of employers to 
workers' collectivities (not the same as Alpha type trade unions) 
controlling the level of commitment to the firm. So industrialization has 
been accompanied by anti-Alpha revolts of all kinds, from sabotage, 
go-slow, company strikes via general strikes to anti-colonial and anti-
neocolonial movements. The struggle is still on. But the focus here is 
more on robotized, automated, symbolic interaction pattern with 
industrialization, if that is still the word. From that destructured and 
decultured perspective Labor and Third World struggles look almost 
utopian; people still relate to each other; they are not yet postmodern. 
Literacy 
Literacy can only be understood in terms of it alternatives: oralacy 
on one hand, and picturacy on the other. Oralacy has as a necessary 
condition memory, stored in the brain. Does it not stand to reason that 
what has to be memorized often is more easily remembered, recalled, 
related to others in Beta type relations (rather than the Alpha type 
relation of readers to authors), and for that reason may be more 
compelling? The decalogue can be retrieved from books and computers. 
But does that ha ve the same binding quality as moral commands 
committed to the individual memory? If not, is literacy, however 
precious, not also paving the way from Formation II into nos. III and 
IV? 
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Picturacy (TV, video) in principie mirrors reality and in practice 
constitutes a virtual reality, an as if (ais ob, commesi) reality. The choice 
has been made for the viewer, as subjectively as any choice. Synchronic 
perception complements the diachrony of oralacy and literacy, but is 
also more easily confused with reality "out there". This, then, adds to 
the detachment by dehumanized structures and relativized cultures. 
Migration 
Whatever the reason, migration as massive mobility across borders, 
which often also means across cultures, will speed up transitions to 
Formation IV considerably, even to the new Formation I of the Los 
Angeles metaphor. Thus, a person, with or without friends and family, 
detached from the structures of the country of origin, arrives in the host 
country, presumably with his/her culture more or less intact. There has 
to be some attachment to a new Alpha structure, relating to the new 
State (permits, etc.), the new Capital (job, etc.), and may b also some 
footholds in the new Civil Society. 
However, the cultural idiom being new relations will be thin indeed. 
The host culture is not easily intemalized. A likely result is a tightly spun 
Beta group of immigrants suspected of being predators rather than prey 
(or, often, both). Los Angeles. This should not be confused with colonialist 
transfers of total societies, with the host population marginalized or 
exterminated. 
Poverty 
Of course poverty is important as a problem of all formadons, when 
instead of looking at structures and cultures we focus on basic human 
needs and their satisfaction. But from a structural point of view poverty 
must not lead to atomie, itcould also lead to tightly woven Beta groups 
fíghting poverty together. And it does not have to lead to anomie, it 
could also lead to the famous culture of poverty of the favela, etc., 
which may sustain rather than negate poverty, but also make it more 
bearable. The worst poverty would be needs-deprivation combined with 
atomie and anomie, in other words the poverty of Formation IV And 
this may very well be the condition under which Los Angeles is no 
longer a metaphor, but a world reality. 
Another, updated perspective on poverty might bring in the jobless 
growth characteristic of the present world economy. The distinction 
between employed and unemployed is too sharp, however. More typical 
is perhaps not only underemployment but underpayment in the sense 
that the concept of the breadwinner able to feed a whole family, one 
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job-one family, is disappearing. In principie this should forcé a number 
of people, in a family or other kiship units, or in a neighborhood, a 
commune, to jointheir incomes so that all can live from it, thereby fostering 
beta restructuration and solidarity. 
Román Law 
It was all pre-programmed in Román Law if the following reading 
of that law or basic philosophy is accepted. In what we generally assume 
to be true about primitive societies holism figures as a basic figure of 
thought, both for Humans andfor Nature, although in practice this applies 
mainly to the near-Humans, meaning the in-group, and the near-Nature, 
meaning this side of the horizon, which for a nomadic people is conside-
rable. This is very far from a basic figure of thought in Román Law, 
dominio, individual ownership. The ownership or use concept of primitive 
peoples is a coupling of two holisms: we as a group use, with care, what 
we find in Nature. To go or jump from that figure of thought to the 
Román holisms must yield to atomism.Humans must be subdivided into 
persons capable of ownership, an example being the pater familias, 
another the emperor; and Nature subdivided into entities capable of 
being owned, as land, plots and minerals, plants, animáis, slaves/women/ 
children. Obviously, for this a census, the sciences of geometry, geology, 
botany andzoology gradually had to take shape. But once the subdivisión 
was done on both sides of the Humans-Nature divide, with the holisms 
broken, the totality could be sewn together again, the Román (to become 
the Western) way: through a one-one mapping of juridical persons on 
objects, the dominio. What belonged toeverybody would then belong to 
nobody; res communis, res nullius. For the non-Westem world ownership 
was acquired by the "first, come, first see, first own" principie: through 
"discoveries". There were transition formulas: the Emperor is the only 
juridical person, like the pater familias for the family, assuming dominio 
of everything- in the West scorned as "Oriental despotism". 
Socialism 
We know it in its stalinist and post-stalinist configuration as super-
Alpha, with, say, 400 people planning for400 million in Eastem Europe 
and the Soviet Union (about the same structure as regional televisión). 
Means of production were collectivized, but not at the level of communes 
as commune-ism but at the level of the state, as state-ism (etatism). 
Revolts were inevitable, not only because of the brutality and repression 
of (post-)stalinist countries. Planning made people passive, expropriating 
from them not only the right to plan their own production, but even to 
plan their own consumption and economy of their own household, 
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restricting the range of what was available. Then people demanded 
their right to be subjects of their own economic fate. For the continuation, 
see Capitalism. 
Urbanization 
The city is a giant Alpha administratively and often also economically, 
but also better suited as a host of countless, rich, diverse, shifting and 
symbiotic Betas than any other human habitat, if for no other reason 
simply because it combines size and proximity into propinquity. It has 
other problems, such as slum-formation, and the alienation of those who 
are marginalized. The young, the oíd and women are often excluded 
from the rich Beta variety of bars and clubs. Moreover, modern cities 
are better designed for cars than for people, eliminating many good 
meeting places such as parks, open land, oíd buildings. Like 
industrialization, urbanization played a key role on the way from Formation 
II to Formation III. But these are the problems of yesteryear even if 
very dramatic in many places. The problem now and in the future is 
that the solutions to these problems should not carry the stamp of 
Formation IV. 
VI. TWO THESES ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
No surprises for the reader in these two theses on social 
development, as the antedote to social disintegration: 
The fírst thesis reads: Créate strong Alpha and strong Beta structures; 
to promote structuration and reverse destructuration 
The second thesis reads: Promote immanent and transcendent 
religión; to promote culturation and to reverse deculturation 
If enacted this would place us in Formation II which is referred to as 
"traditional society", referring to that cycle of human history. But the 
defínitions of these formations transcend the concreteness of the travel 
from nomadism to monadism. We also have a future, and the hunch 
derived from these deliberations is that we need both Alpha (because 
"some big is necessary") and Beta (because "small is beautiful"). But 
this in no way means moving backward in history (which would be 
impossible anyhow), but to try to créate a new cycle. A not very promising 
beginning has already been indicated, not only the tribal warfare in the 
wastelands of Los Angeles, but also the warfare in Ulster, ex-Yugosla-
via, ex-Soviet Union and Turkey in Europe; Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in África; Guatemala and México in Latin America; 
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Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia in Asia, to give some examples. Strong 
on Beta, weak on Alpha, and very violent. 
One still positive example of Formation II comes to themind: Japan. 
Betas in the form of cohorts are incorporated into the Alphas of 
bureaucracies and corporations by way of lifelong employment (so that 
people stay together inside the organization) and seniority promotion 
(so that people stay at the same level for some time, being promoted 
together at least to startwith). 
But at the same time Japan also benefits from the co- existence, in 
one society, of both transcendent (State Shinto), immanent (Folk Shinto, 
Buddhism) and secularism (Confucianism). In principie a Japanese not 
only lives both in Alpha and in Beta, but may also pay allegiance to all 
three systems of faith at the same time (and in addition to that Christianity 
and Rationalism). Thus, we would expect a certain resilience in Japan, 
being both structurally and culturally intact, playing on both structures 
and both cultures. This might look like redundance, but the key to resilience 
is exactly that, redundance to be on the safe side. Henee, we would 
expect relatively low disintegration rates of the usual kind, adding divorce 
to the typology of violence. 
Japan is today exposed to a tremendous pressure both from the 
outside, particularly from the U.S., and from the inside, maybe particularly 
from bureaucrats, businessmen and scholars whohave been to the U.S. 
and found the society liberating. Asmentioned above, Beta and immanent 
religión can be confining; Alpha and transcendent religión both open up 
grand vistas. But the conclusión from these deliberations would be to 
be very careful: the costs of that type of modernization are enormous 
and the remedies not very clear as moving backward, recreating past 
structures and cultures, may be impossible. To pressure Japan into 
policies that will have moves toward Formation IV as alikely consequence 
should be classified as some kind of social crime, structurocide cum 
culturocide. 
Which does not mean that Japan and Japan-similar countries are 
perfect. With more emphasis on social growth and costs and less on 
economic growth and costs good policies should emerge. 
In general the fírst thesis would have two sub-theses: to recréate 
Beta, and to rehumanize Alpha. One way of doing thisis found all over 
in Western countries: créate Beta inside Alphas of any kind, bureaucratic, 
corporate, academic. Individualismbeing so basic to Western cosmology 
the Japanese way of tying people to the same organization for Ufe will 
almost have a taste of imprisonment, and parallel promotion would 
disregard differences in individual potential and merit. But Beta 
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integration does not have to be cohort- (Le., social generation) based; it 
could also be work-related. The problem with experiments in team-
work and team-teaching would be the scarcity of compelling indicators 
of the valué of social integration whenthere are little, no or even negative 
economic gains. At present the significance of social integration must 
come as a credo. 
Thus, in any trend to abolish assembly-lines in favor of teams 
assembling the product together there is a clear potential for Beta growth 
and some Alpha decline. The same applies to modern office landscapes 
with a high level of mutual visibility, easily organized round tasks, grouping 
together those who should work together. The contrast would be the 
one person-one office structure, an architectural recipe for fragmentation, 
with the lunch, the coffee-break and the water-cooler as the only 
alternatives. And they are not so likely to be well suited forproduction-
oriented Betas, with the exception of the "business lunch". But what, 
then, happens to reproduction-oriented Betas? 
At the universities this would point to the colloquium as a fine Beta 
structure, for professors, for students, and for both. In the U.S. these 
structures are remarkably infrequent. 
In banking this might point to the interesting lead by the Grameen 
Bank introduced in Bangla Desh. Really poor people do not have equity 
for bank loans, if they did the loan might not have been needed. Instead 
ten persons guarantee one tenth each, and together they constitute a 
Beta group around the debtor. 
This reminds us of the famous Zehnergruppen in ex-DDR, groups 
of ten people working together, introduced in economic organizations to 
increase production and productivity. As such they may have failed, as 
Beta groups they seem to be much missed. Of course, Western capitalist 
society have much to offer interms of voluntary organizations (although 
they often acquire Alpha character, becoming big and formalized). But 
they are usually not directly work related. 
Another interesting Beta innovation is, of course, what in Germán is 
called the WG, the Wohngemeinschaft, the "commune" of like-minded 
people living and to some extent consuming together, sharing all the 
work of the household. An extended family except for the kinship fac-
tor. Of course this was a longing for Beta in a society where even 
nuclear families collapse. It should notbejudgedby the ability or wish 
of the members to stay together as long as "real" family members; the 
socio-logic is different. It may also be a major way of infernalizing 
conviviality norms. 
Rehumanization of Alpha: simply ban all automated responses, let 
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people have a chance to put their questions to a human being and get 
human answers, however fallible, back. The social costsof not doing so 
will by far outweigh the economic costs of employing more people in 
the services. Moreover, such positions do not have to be full time jobs. 
What is needed is humanity. 
Then, some points on culture, in the narrow sense used hereof binding 
ethical rules. In the choice between an ethics of compassion and an 
ethics of submission, between a religión ofmeditation and one of prayer 
the answer might be to choose both, with an important proviso to be 
spelt out shortly. There is muchto build on; rich religious experience to 
draw upon. There is also room for secular approaches, perhaps not the 
Enlightenmentcult of Ratio so much as the general wisdom of "reciprocal 
rights and obligations", found all over the world, with at least some 
ethical inspiration to be derived from its moral basis, the lex talionis, 
both in its negative and positive formulations. 
But there is another distinction that may be more important than the 
sacred-secular and immanent-transcendent; hard vs. soft. The word 
religión comes from religare, relink, reconnect with that out there, the 
holy, the sacred. Union of some kind is the goal of all religions, with 
Others past-present-future in this life by immersing oneself fully in the 
net of compassion with all life, with God and others in the afterlife by 
submitting to His commands. In mysticism this experience probably 
becomes like a light so strong that everything else loses its contours. 
Imagine now a circle around this epicenter of religious experience, 
divided into sectors foreach religión. The notionof religión as linking, 
connecting, unifying is still there. Religión is not used to draw lines 
between the adherents of this or that religión, ñor between the righteous 
and the sinners. A religión is more seen like a language, an idiom in 
which religious experience is expressed. This is the soft circle, perhaps 
more found in religions of compassion than of submission. 
Outside this circle comes the circle for hard religión. The ñames of 
the sectors for the religions are the same, but the message changes 
character. The focus is on what divides rather than ln what unifies. 
Other religions are denounced as pagan, or even worse, as heresy. The 
sinners are in for very harsh treatment; even hell, the torture chamber 
of hard religión, is invoked for their afterlife. The righteous from the 
right religión are seen as Chosen Persons in the eyes of God, and some 
nations are often seen as closer to God than others, includingthe sinners 
and the non-believers. Naturally, hard religions of that type can be well 
suited as state religions, mirroring in religious terms the struggle among 
states in world politics. 
So, an elaboration of the second thesis for social development would 
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be to promote the softer aspects of the religions, and try to demote the 
harder (harsher) aspects. Thus, the most important struggle in the religio-
scape, the religious landscape of the world, is not the traditional struggle 
among religions as to which one is most suited to carry humanity forward, 
but he inner struggle between the unifying and thedivisive forces. "Soft 
religionists of the world unite, you have only your harder brother and 
sisters to lose"? Not quite, because that would draw a too hard line 
between soft and hard. The important point is that the struggle is within 
rather than between, and that each religión has this struggle on its agen-
da. Moreover, the harder aspects (Inquisition, witch-burning) have no 
doubt contributed to giving religión a bad ñame. Quakers and Sufis, 
Buddhists and Baha'is offer much softer approaches. But none of them 
would be entirely free from the harder aspects. 
For humanists this would imply a softening of the line they sometimes 
draw between themselves and the religionists, following the tradition of 
18th century Europe. In short, there is a message to everybody in the 
word that is No. 1 in the vocabulary of the present Dalai Lama: 
compassion. 
Do these two theses add up to the standard conservative message 
of family and Christianity? No, but that message is not rejected either. 
Her "family" is taken in a much broader sense, Beta. Moreover, attention 
is paid to how to soften, humanize, the other major structural type, Alpha. 
And instead of Christianity we are of course speaking about all religions, 
scared and secular (civil), but then limiting it again to the softer aspects. 
But conservatives have probably diagnosed the present situation better 
than many liberals/marxists/greens, by focussing on one structural and 
one cultural component. Peopleon the left tend to be almost obsessively 
focused on some kind of Alpha, its proper design, function and structure; 
its distribution of rights and duties, power and privilege, at the expense 
of Beta (except for the greens) and culture, ethos. But however that 
may be, the present paper tries to give something to both, perhaps with 
the strong admonition to the left of taking culture, ethos, religión more 
seriously, getting out of the habit of seeing them as "superstructura" or 
"opium". 
Nothing of this will emerge automatically, and in crises people may 
also tum to the harder aspects of the religions with divisive messages 
and Alpha organization. But just as we postúlate a normal human Beta 
drive for the small an tight, why not also daré postúlate a corresponding 
religious inclination? 
And that brings us to the end of this narrative, with the short excursión 
into a very uncertain future. With structural and cultural ties being 
dissolved, we are in the, some would say absurd, situation that the most 
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modern and economic/technically developed have become the socially 
speaking least perhaps least developed, or de-developed. Obviously, 
we are then not talking about the relative presence of social services 
(per 1,000 inhabitants, etc.) but of something held to be much more 
basic: structuration and culturation. Social services may be a part of the 
problem rather than of the solution to the extent they are operated through 
increasingly dehumanized Alpha structures. With atomie/anomie being 
the basic social price paid for modernization because people have taken 
for granted that society is solid and can be drawn upon for any purpose, 
the more and most developed have suddenly become the less and least 
developed. 
Does that mean that the economically/technically least developed 
are the socially most developed? Not necessarily. Some very poor Third 
World countries have been ravaged by unspeakable violence between 
classes, nations and clans, with the rest of the world often siding with 
one against the other(s). Some of this violence may be attributable to 
atomie/anomie, and there are signs that it has reached the micro level 
of social organization, with family members butchering each other; i.e., 
total violence. 
However, much is intact, in Southern and Eastern Europe more than 
in North-Western Europe; in Central and South America more than in 
North America. One day the present First world may ask the present 
Third world for advise about social development. If that happens, the 
world would have taken a major step forward. 
